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resumo: O artigo analisa a influência 
da Revolução Cubana e do Che na 
Lotta Continua (LC) - a principal 
organização da esquerda extra-
parlamentar italiana - de 1969 a 
1974, através das páginas do jornal 
Lotta continua. Che era um exemplo 
político e moral para LC, que em 1974 
foi além do mito e alcançou uma 
visão equilibrada sobre ele. A questão 
da relevância de Che na Itália atual 
também é avaliada.
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1 Introduction
The Cuban Revolution was arguably one of the crucial events 
of 20th century Latin American history. Researchers have dedica-
ted much attention to the topic throughout the years (HUGH, 1977; 
PÉREZ-STABLE, 1999; SWEIG, 2002; VELTMEYER; RUSHTON, 
2012). However, the Cuban Revolution was so important also 
because of the influence it exerted on the outer world, intentionally 
and unintentionally. This influence may be divided into two types. 
The first type of influence consisted of Cuban military and moral 
support to liberation struggles all over the world (JAYATILLEKA, 
2007). The second type consisted of the inspiration it gave to the 
Left of many countries, both in the West and in the periphery. 
This last topic has been researched remarkably little. Certainly, 
the influence of the Cuban Revolution cannot be separated from 
that of its icon Che Guevara. Guevara, in fact, inspired Western 
Leftists even more then Fidel Castro. The figure of Guevara, howe-
ver, has largely entered the realm of T-shirts and of iconic consu-
merism, compelling researchers to go beyond myth (CASEY, 2009; 
GABBAS, 2017).  
One case which deserves attention is Italy. In fact, Italy was 
arguably the Western country which underwent the highest level 
of leftist radicalisation in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, studying 
the influence of the Cuban Revolution and of Guevarism on the 
Italian Left is certainly useful. It is safe to say that a crucial trigger 
for this radicalisation was the 1968-1969 biennio rosso (two red 
years). Apart from other things, the biennio rosso sparked the birth 
of many parties, organisations, and publications of the Italian New 
Left. The New Left was certainly more influenced by the Cuban 
Revolution and Guevarism than the two parties of the traditional 
Italian Left, the PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano) and the PCI (Partito 
Comunista Italiano). 
However, a study on the influence of Cuba and of Guevara on the 
Italian Left would require a book rather than an article. Therefore, 
this article is more limited in scope, and deals with the reception of 
the Cuban Revolution and of Che’s figure on Lotta Continua (LC). 
Lotta Continua was chosen because it was the largest organisation 
of the extra-parliamentary Left (BOBBIO, 1988). It can therefore 
The cuban revoluTion, che and lotta continua
Tensões Mundiais, ForTaleza, v. 16, n. 31 P. 219-245, 2020   |  221
be said to be the most representative, though not entirely repre-
sentative. The Cuban/Guevarian reception is analysed through the 
LC newspaper Lotta continua. The analysis spans from 1969, when 
LC was born, until 1974. This was chosen as an end-date becau-
se on October 8, 1974 Lotta continua commemorated the seventh 
anniversary of Che’s death strongly reconsidering his legacy. 
Therefore, one may say that 1974 marked the end of a cycle for LC, 
which went from a more idealised to a more distanced and balan-
ced view. The conclusions also contain a few thoughts on whether 
Guevara’s legacy may be relevant in present-day Italy.
2 The influence of the cuban revolution and of guevarismo 
on Lotta continua
LC issued a biweekly magazine named Lotta continua since 
November 1969 – the year of birth of LC - until 1972. Lotta continua 
became a daily newspaper on April 11, 1972.  The newspaper went 
out until 1982. However, the organisation had de facto ceased to 
exist with the 1976 Rimini Congress.
Lotta continua evidently considered the Cuban Revolution 
crucial since one of its first issues. In January 1970 a first mention 
of the Cuban Revolution can be found. The Cuban Revolution, 
together with the Russian Revolution and the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution, was worth studying from a theoretical viewpoint. Note 
worthily, the bienno rosso of 1968-1969 (the Italian “two red years”) 
had just passed by. They were two years of high political radica-
lisation which prompted further radicalisation during the 1970s. 
Traditionally, this biennio is divided into the students’ 1968 and 
the workers’ 1969. However, students’ and workers’ radicalisa-
tion merged in subsequent years (BALESTRINI; MORONI, 2007; 
VENTRONE, 2012; HORN, 2007; KATSIAFICAS, 1987). According 
to Lotta continua, the Cuban and the other revolutions had to be 
assimilated by workers’ vanguards so that they could “develop a 
communist and revolutionary discourse within mass movements” 
(QUALE…, 1970, p. 03). There is evidence the LC local groups had 
the Cuban Revolution as one of their public discussion topics as 
early as April 1970 (I GIOVANI…, 1970). 
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Sometimes, Lotta continua reported Fidel Castro’s declarations. 
For example, in May 1972 the newspaper reported Castro’s decla-
ration on the Vietnam War. While in Algiers, Castro said that Nixon 
was “committing genocide” in Vietnam (LA CRONACA…, 1972, p. 
04). Moreover, Nixon should beware the 1972 was not 1962 (the 
year of the missiles’ crisis), and that the situation was no longer in 
his favour. 
Lotta continua’s attitude towards Cuba, however, was some-
times contradictory, even within one issue. As we have seen, 
Guevara was celebrated as someone who opposed American 
imperialism as well as the Soviet Union. However, in the issue of 
May 14, 1972 Lotta continua negatively noted that the USSR was 
penetrating into Latin America and had good relations with Cuba 
(L’URSS…, 1972). A few pages later, the newspaper celebrated 
Cuban medical aid to the sieged Vietnam (L’UMANITÀ…, 1972).
Lotta continua was convinced that Che’s spirit continued to 
live in Argentinian and Chilean workers’ struggles of July 1973. 
In fact, leftist internationalism began to “walk on its own legs.” 
LC was convinced that class consciousness and the linked duties 
were being felt by real South American revolutionaries. This was 
the “proletarian sense of the message the Che left Latin America” 
(CILE…, 1973, p. 04). The legacy of the Cuban Revolution, however, 
was not guaranteed forever. On July 22, the newspaper warned 
that the Brazilian “counterrevolution” could “delete for a long 
time the consequences of the Cuban Revolution” (LA CONTRO-
RIVOLUZIONE…, 1973, p. 01). 
Cuba was praised also because of its foreign policy stances. 
For example, in September 1973 at the non-aligned conference in 
Algiers Cuba broke diplomatic ties with Israel, showing its soli-
darity to Arab peoples. In the conference Castro allegedly played 
a pro-Soviet role, while Gaddafi boasted opposition to “all impe-
rialisms”. Lotta continua noted that Castro’s pro-Soviet stance did 
not hinder him from being anti-American, putting therefore into 
question the theory of collaboration among the two superpowers. 
However, Cuba was “non-aligned” only by name, since de facto 
depended on Soviet economic aid (SI APRE…, 1973). Overall, 
Lotta continua clearly made a distinction between Guevara and 
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Castro. While Guevara was seen as a pure revolutionary, Castro 
was rather treated as a practical politician whose policies where 
sometimes criticised. In this precise case, the newspaper argued 
that Castro may have played a leading role for world revolutio-
nary movements, but his pro-Soviet stance made that impossible 
(ALGERI…, 1973). 
3 Cuba, Guevara and revolutionary violence
For Lotta Continua, the Cuban Revolution and the figure of 
Guevara were not mere symbolical-political examples. They repre-
sented a successful takeover of power through military means, 
and thus inspired Italian radicals (similarly to other Third World 
leaders: Mao, Ho Chi Minh, etc.). Violence was deemed necessary 
in the Third World, but also in Italy. Aafter all, had not Che Guevara 
underlined the “theoretical necessity” of a “revolutionary armed 
Internationale”? (LOTTA…, 1972, p. 03). 
Remarkably, in October 1970, Lotta continua dedicated Ernesto 
Guevara a full-page article, significantly titled “Creare 2, 3, molti 
Vietnam - Che Guevara vive” (To Create 2, 3, Many Vietnams – Che 
Guevara Lives). The magazine quoted Guevara’s famous slogan, 
and thought that his ideas lived in contemporary struggles. The 
article praised the courage of the “Argentinian physician” who had 
actively taken part in 3 revolutions notwithstanding his asthma: 
Guatemala, Cuba, and Bolivia (CHE…, 1970). More precisely, Lotta 
continua blamed Guevara’s death both on Barrientos’s military 
regime and on the Bolivian Communist Party. On the one hand, 
Barrientos’s regime enjoyed Soviet economic aid and had good 
relations with the USSR. On the other, the secretary of the Bolivian 
Communist Party, Mario Monje, allegedly betrayed Guevara and 
his guerrilla movement (Lotta continua reported in May 1972 his 
arrest in La Paz) (L’URUGUAY…, 1972). 
Therefore, Che’s death was “exemplary” also on a theoreti-
cal level. It was caused both by imperialism (personified by the 
US) and revisionism (personified by the Soviet Union and by the 
betraying Bolivian Communist Party), allied with “Latin American 
oligarchies” (CHE…, 1970, p. 05). While imperialism was the 
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people’s declared enemy, revisionists falsely acted as friends. Here 
a crucial trend is detectable, typical not only of Lotta Continua but 
of many other Italian extra-parliamentary Leftist organisations. 
The USSR was no longer considered a point of reference, since 
it was a betraying and revisionist power (remarkably, the official 
Italian Communist Party – PCI - was attached to the Soviet Union). 
The extreme Left opposed to world (USSR) and Italian revisionism 
(PCI) a pantheon of international references which went from Mao 
to Che Guevara. In fact, the very term “revisionism” came from 
Maoism (NICCOLAI, 1998).
From this article one more crucial point emerges. Lotta continua 
thought that Che Guevara exemplified righteous armed struggle 
as opposed to opportunist, revisionist, parliamentary methods. 
According to the opportunist, “’you can make a revolution peace-
fully,’ by voting, by using mass struggles as parliamentary pressure, 
etc.” No, according to Lotta continua, “Che’s death remains exem-
plary […] because millions of young and of proletarians made him 
resurrect before USA, USSR, RANGERS and various C[ommunist]
P[arties] could bury him.” Moreover, the article argues, Che’s death 
“strengthened revolution” and weakened the enemy. 1968, “the 
year of the students and […] of the French May” spread Guevara’s 
image “in every corner of the world. And today we see his images, 
his slogans, his political line, his example multiplying and appea-
ring in the new events of Latin America, of the Middle East, of 
Indochina, of Europe, within the USA itself.” 
At the same time, the article rejected “Guevarismo.” With a 
pattern similar to that adopted towards Maoism, Lotta continua 
insisted that one should not “stick labels.” 
Luckily, there is no Guevarist orthodoxy and heresy. To unders-
tand “Che”, to make him live in our struggles against imperialists 
and opportunists is already an everyday practice of ever-increa-
sing masses. The point is not to be Guevarists, but to be revolutio-
naries. And for us “Che” is especially his hatred for compromise, 
his being on the first line, his deeply and rightly loving the people, 
his militant internationalism, his rejection of material incentives, 
his necessity to create a new man on this shitty society.          
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This long quote shows that Lotta Continua saw Guevara as a 
political as well as a moral point of reference. LC liked Guevara’s 
rejection of compromise and his courage, his selflessness and his 
moral rectitude: he was in favour of moral rather than of material 
incentives, and contended that nothing less than the creation of a 
“new man” was necessary to make life on this earth worth living. 
The article went on:
We think that “Che” is a “biased” dead. A “mi-
litant” dead, in the sense that he does not 
belong to everyone: he does not belong to the 
bourgeois (who after his death put a “saint’s” 
halo on him creating the disgusting and de-
formed myth of the Don Quijote-like, stain-
less, fearless adventurer,… and above all, 
“deceased.” (cHe…, 1970, p. 05).     
Lotta continua is clearly presenting Guevara as a highly poli-
tically charged figure: not just anyone had a right to his legacy. 
Remarkably, the depiction of Guevara as a “Don Quijote-like, stain-
less, fearless adventurer” bears some resemblance to that made 
by one of his recent biographers (CASTAÑEDA, 1998). Moreover, 
Che could not belong to “opportunists” either, since they “used him 
[only] as a cadaver to draw the sympathy of the young who ‘were 
fascinated by him’.” 
Lotta continua launched a further attack against the PCI, by 
saying that one its leaders, Amendola, had defined Guevara a “small 
drugstores’ strategist” a few months before his death. According 
to Amendola, Guevara’s watchword of “many Vietnams” was 
irresponsible. LC was drawing a clear line between itself and the 
PCI: the PCI hypocritically opposed the Italian proletariat and its 
vanguards, “in the name of ‘the country’s general interest, of its 
productive development, of peace and democracy’.” Finally, the 
magazine stated: “Guevara, like any revolutionary, is not a ‘holy 
card’ to show off nor a (individualist and aesthetical) myth to glori-
fy.” Revolutionaries are “expressed by proletarian struggles: they 
emerge from them, drawing strength and humanity from them. In 
them they continue to live” (CHE…, 1970, p. 05). We can see that 
there are two levels in the interpretation of Lotta continua: on the 
one hand, they extremely respected and paid homage to Guevara. 
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On the other hand, they strongly rejected a personalistic and indi-
vidualistic view of history and of great men/great revolutionaries. 
Guevara was certainly a great man and a great revolutionary, but 
great revolutionaries are the expression of “proletarian struggles.” 
They are born in them, and obtain from them the necessary force 
and humanity (LÖWY, 1997). What is more, the same proletarian 
struggles give further life to the deceased revolutionaries. 
Lotta continua buttressed its analysis on Guevara with two texts 
authored by him. One was a short farewell letter written to his 
children, the other was an extract from his famous “Message to 
the Tricontinental.” In the letter to his children, Guevara under-
lined that he was a man acting consistently with his thought and 
faithful to his convictions. The letter also contains the famous 
phrase “Above all, always be capable of feeling deeply any injus-
tice committed against anyone, anywhere in the world. This is the 
most beautiful quality in a revolutionary.” 
Conversely, the Message to the Tricontinental had a completely 
different tone. In it, Guevara called for the destruction of impe-
rialism through the elimination of the United States, “its most 
powerful stronghold.” The enemy had to be destroyed gradually 
by liberating one country after the other, thus depriving it of its 
supporting bases. This entailed a “long” and “cruel war” (CHE…, 
1970, p. 05). Talking about Vietnam, Guevara said it was not 
enough to wish it success: one should follow its “destiny […] in 
death or in victory.” According to Guevara, “inflexible hate towards 
the enemy” was a “struggle factor” which could convert man “into 
an effective, violent, selective and cold killing machine.” However, 
the text goes on: “The real revolutionary is led by great feelings of 
love.” S/he “must have a passionate spirit and a cold mind” and 
“idealise this love for humanity, for the most sacred causes, and 
make it unique, indivisible.” S/he must possess a great dose of 
humanity, a great dose of sense of justice and of truth not to fall 
into dogmatic excesses, into cold scholasticisms, not to become 
isolated by the masses. One must fight everyday so that this love 
of humanity is transformed into concrete facts [,] into acts which 
must serve as example, as mobilisation. 
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Many Vietnams meant deaths and “immense tragedies, with 
their part of everyday heroism” (DAL MESSAGGIO…, 1970, p. 
21). Arguably, Lotta continua did not choose these two contras-
ting texts by chance. On the one hand, juxtaposing them one 
could see the mixture of humanism and mercilessness so typical 
of Guevara, exemplified by the motto: “One has to grow hard but 
without ever loosing tenderness”. However, according to Roberto 
Massari (2018), this quotation has always been misattributed to 
Guevara, while it was supposedly created by Guevara’s contested, 
first biographer, the Argentinian Ricardo Rojo (1923 - 1996). On the 
other, here LC confirms a trend which can be similarly detected in 
parallel articles on Maoism. LC did not hide violence from Third 
World leaders. On the contrary, LC agreed with it. This agreement 
with violent methods used by Third World leaders went on a par 
with the theorisation and justification of violence at home, in Italy. 
Therefore, Guevarism – and Maoism - seemingly gave a contribu-
tion to the development of violence within the Italian extra-parlia-
mentary Left.
Further proof of this can be found in a 1972, May 21 piece. 
Lotta continua published the foreword of Gian Battista Lazagna’s 
book Ponte rotto – La lotta al fascismo dalla cospirazione all’insur-
rezione armata (Broken Bridge: The Struggle Against Fascism from 
Conspiration to Armed Insurrection). The title of the article is: 
“Riprendere il cammino inziato con la lotta partigiana” (“We Must 
Continue the Path of Partisan Struggle”). Gian Battista Lazagna 
was a former Italian partisan who in 1972 was in prison, accu-
sed of organising communist armed struggle in Italy. Both the title 
of Lotta continua and of Lazagna’s book are telling. LC is openly 
calling for taking up arms, to continue the fight begun by Italian 
Resistance. For Lazagna, to struggle against Fascism peaceful, 
democratic, or even conspiratorial methods were not enough: 
sooner or later, one had to resort to armed struggle. At the time, 
Lazagna but also many radicals from the extra-parliamentary Left 
thought that neofascism was as dangerous as historical Fascism, 
and had to be fought with the same means. It is here that Cuba 
comes as inspiration. In fact, Lazagna plainly says: 
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Cuba made its socialist revolution and notwithstanding the 
logic of the division of the world into two fields managed to be 
respected. Will for Italian revolutionaries, for Communists, come 
the moment to go out from the defensive, to let workers’, poor 
southern peasants’ and students’ revolutionary will overflow from 
the frame allowed by the system? (RIPRENDERE…, 1972, p. 03). 
Lazagna is more or less subtly calling for ar-
med organisation of the Left, and Cuba is for 
him a source of inspiration. Cuba was a small 
island, and it managed to defend its own re-
volution even though it was only a few miles 
away from the US. Why could not the Italian 
revolutionary Left do the same? Lazagna’s 
hint at the world division into spheres of in-
fluence may also have been a subtle criticism 
of the USSR (was Cuba alternative to both 
Western imperialism and the USSR?).  
Lotta continua exemplified this connection between Guevara 
and the necessity of violence also regarding third countries. In 
October 1972 Lotta continua interviewed the IRA leader Sean Mac 
Stiofain (LC supported the IRA). According to Mac Stiofain, there 
was a great difference between “revolutionary socialists, like Che 
Guevara or general Giap, and nominal socialism.” Guevara was a 
real fighter, and the IRA loved and respected “real fighters, revo-
lutionaries ready to die for their cause, like Che Guevara did.” The 
IRA made a “fundamental distinction between propagandists of 
Moscow-oriented parties, which teach revolution but never prac-
tice it, and those who make it, possibly with mistakes, but they 
make it.” Sean Mac Stiofain further clarified: “I want to underline it 
once more: this is the difference between Che Guevara, the revo-
lutionary of practice, and Breznev or any other general secretary 
of Western communist parties, who obeys to Moscow” (STIOFAIN, 
1972, p. 02). By saying this Mac Stiofain – and LC implicitly agreed 
with his stance – was not only underlining that Guevara was a real, 
consistent revolutionary who was not afraid to take up arms. Mac 
Stiofain drew the line between real revolutionaries like Guevara on 
one side, and Moscow-oriented, passive communist parties on the 
other. Mac Stiofain’s remarks to Lotta continua confirm the fact that 
Guevara was seen in the Italian Left as a revolutionary opposed to 
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the sclerotised, cowardly, passive USSR and its satellite parties. 
The USSR was no longer the leading country for Italian radicals.
By the end of 1972, Lotta continua thought that the develop-
ments of the Vietnam war confirmed the validity of Guevara’s 
watchword of many Vietnams. In fact, according to the newspa-
per, that watchword “has lost none of the significance it had when 
it was pronounced; on the contrary, it has acquired the more value 
the more his theories, and his practice” of the guerrilla foco has lost 
it. Remarkably, this quote shows that LC admired Guevara’s watch-
words, but did not necessarily agree with his theory and practice 
of foquismo. Moreover, Guevara’s was not the “slogan of a ‘fana-
tic,’ like Amendola and with him all the PCI leading group argued 
[…] but a scientific, because Marxist [,] forecast of historical deve-
lopment” (LA POSTA…, 1972, p. 03). Lotta continua insisted that 
Guevara’s watchword had already become a reality in Indochina, 
and could become such in India and many other countries.     
4 Cuba, Sardinia and Feltrinelli 
Remarkably, in July 1971 Lotta continua published the letter of 
a convict who made a comparison between Cuba and Sardinia. 
This convict, writing from the prison of Volterra, was talking about 
the possibilities of political work in his prison. He thought he 
could conduct political work among Sardinian convicts, for exam-
ple comparing “the present-day Sardinian conditions with other 
insular nations, for example the pre-Castro Cuba” (I DANNATI…, 
1971, p. 32). This comparison, however short, is important and 
deserves special attention. Italy has always been plagued by a 
North-South divide. However, it is safe to say that this divide is 
even more evident in its two large islands, Sicily and Sardinia. 
Between the two, we may say in Sardinia this divide is even more 
evident than in Sicily, because Sardinia is much further from the 
Italian peninsula than Sicily. At the time Sardinia was one of the 
poorest and most backward Italian regions, and was characterised 
by what Giovanni Lilliu (2002) called the “costante resistenziale 
sarda”, that is a sort of constant pattern of rebellion. This sub-text 
is fundamental to understand the letter published in Lotta continua. 
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The convict – himself not a Sardinian – is implying that Sardinia 
suffered from a backwardness also due to its being an island (and 
abandoned by the central government). This situation of insular 
backwardness could be compared with that of Cuba – itself a small 
island – and a similarly revolutionary solution could be proposed. 
This may seem absurd. However, this was not solely the idea 
of a solitary Italian convict. In fact, a similar idea had come to 
the mind of Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, a rich Italian publisher and 
Communist. Between 1967 and 1969 Feltrinelli travelled to Sardinia 
and had the idea to finance a revolutionary guerrilla movement 
there. He allegedly had the idea to use as leader the famous bandit 
Graziano Mesina. Carla Frontini, who would later be part of the 
“Manifesto” group, remembers him saying that Sardinia should 
become “the Cuba of the Mediterranean”. According to the deputy 
public prosecutor Viola Sardinia was nothing less than a “bomb 
fused by Feltrinelli” (SARDEGNA, 1972, p. 02).  The reason why 
Feltrinelli did not realise his plan his unclear. Possibly, he did not 
have the time, since he went into hiding after the December 12, 
1969 terrorist attack in Milan, and later died on March 14, 1972 
while trying to blow up an electricity trellis near Milan (MENTANA, 
2017; NELLA…, 2011; MASSIDDA, 2016; FELTRINELLI, 1999).   
Remarkably, in its first daily issue, on April 11, 1972, Lotta conti-
nua linked Feltrinelli to Guevara. Feltrinelli had died almost one 
month before, and many in the Italian Left were not convinced 
by the official version of the events. But a very important event 
took place between March 14 and April 11, 1972. In fact, on 
April 1, 1972 a woman named Monika Ertl, of the Bolivian ELN 
(Ejército de Liberación Nacional), killed the Bolivian Consul in 
Hamburg Quintanilla Pereira. Quintanilla had been one the men 
responsible for Che Guevara’s death, therefore Monika Ertl some-
what avenged Che (RAMON, 2017). According to Lotta continua, 
Quintanilla’s death was not a murder but an execution. However, 
what is incredible is that the newspaper suggests that the gun used 
to kill Quintanilla had belonged to Feltrinelli (the gun had allege-
dly been confiscated from Feltrinelli by the Italian political police) 
(FELTRINELLI…, 1972, p. 02). In May 1973, Lotta continua repor-
ted on the death of one more person who was involved in Che’s 
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death, colonel Selich. According to the newspaper, Selich had died 
in suspicious circumstances. Not was that all, because he was alle-
gedly the third man involved in Che’s death who died. Before him, 
captain Ramos had died in 1968 of diabetes, while second lieute-
nant Huerta had died in a car accident in 1971. Lotta continua titled 
the article “E sono tre!” (“And there’s three of them!”) possibly 
pleased with what had happened, but also hinted that these deaths 
might have had something mysterious. Could someone kill them, 
because they had something to hide? (BOLIVIA…, 1973, p. 04).   
One more execution in Guevara’s name took place on year later, 
in April 1973, when the ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo) 
killed an Argentinian general. In its communiqué taking respon-
sibility for his death, the ERP said that it was “following the path 
opened by our comrade Che Guevara for a just, free and socialist 
Argentina” (ARGENTINA…, 1973, p. 03).
5 Cuba and Chile
Guevara’s name was shouted as inspiration during the pro-Chi-
lean demonstrations which followed the September 11, 1973 coup 
(DECINE…, sept. 1973), possibly even “louder than in the past” 
(ROMA…, 1973, p. 01). Che was present in pro-Chile demonstra-
tions in Paris and in Panama too, with large banners depicting him 
(DECINE…, dec. 1973; PuGni…, 1974). The link between Che’s 
figure and the Chilean struggle was also made clear by initiatives 
organised in Rome by the Association of Latin American Students 
and Intellectuals. On October 7, 1973 Lotta continua reported that 
Latin American students were not granted any hall at the university 
of Rome to commemorate Guevara (NON…, 1973). However, they 
managed to commemorate him on October 17, while expressing 
solidarity towards the Chilean people. Delegations from Unidad 
Popular and Cuba were supposed to attend (MANIFESTAZIONE…, 
1973). 
Again on the October 7, 1973 issue, Lotta continua comme-
morated Guevara more widely by publishing a few texts written 
by him. As the headline reads “After six years. Che lives”. The 
newspaper meant to present short texts which summarised the 
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crucial steps of Che’s political experience. Apart from the Cuban 
Revolution, the newspaper talked about the “difficult experience” 
of managing the socialist state. Moreover, Guevara had to face the 
“first degenerations of the system,” the “old problem of ‘bureau-
cratism’,” the lack of technical knowledge. By choosing to bring 
revolution to other countries, Che was following a “global strate-
gic vision.” According to LC, the Chilean coup demonstrated that 
Che’s lucid forecast of a long and cruel war had proven right. Che’s 
writings went from his first encounter with Fidel Castro in Mexico 
to Che’s last letter to Fidel, which was read by Fidel himself on the 
Plaza de la Revolución on October 3, 1965. In that letter – which 
inspired Carlos Puebla to write his famous song - Che renounced 
to all his official posts and privileges as a Cuban functionary. He 
bade farewell to Cuba, explaining that “other sierras needed his 
modest efforts” (SEI…, 1973, p. 03).  
Cuban behaviour was praised in the days following the Chilean 
coup, when Cuban government offered to welcome Chilean exiles 
(DEPORTATI…, 1973), and when Castro denounced US role in the 
Chilean coup (FIDEL…, 1973). The Chilean coup even prompted 
Cuba and Vietnam to release a joint declaration to strengthen 
the struggle “against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonia-
lism”. To achieve that goal, socialist countries should unite on the 
basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism (SI 
ALLARGA…, 1973).  Obviously, Cuba would have no diplomatic 
ties with the new junta, and hosted Allende’s wife for some public 
initiatives (LA RESISTENZA…, 1973). Large anti-junta demons-
trations were organised in Cuba (CASTRO…, 1973). In October 
1973 MIR secretary Miguel Enriquez underlined in an appeal 
published in Lotta continua that Cuban support was fundamental 
(UN APPELLO…, 1973) (Lotta continua published excerpts from 
a Granma commemorative article when Enriquez was killed the 
following year) (HASTA…, 1974). After all, the MIR had studied 
the experience of the Cuban Revolution (LA STORIA…, 1973) 
and wished to follow it, together with Che’s plan of a continental 
Latin American revolution (SALVIAMO…, 1974). The Chilean junta 
replied to Cuban activism by accusing it at the UN of fomenting a 
revolution in Chile (ALL’ONU…, 1973). 
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In the aftermath of the coup, Lotta continua also thought that 
Guevara’s example lived in the project of international brigades 
to help Chile (IL CAMMINO…, 1973). Armed Chilean resistance 
thought that Guevara was a relevant example of Latin American 
internationalism (RESISTENCIA, 1973). Chilean resistance thought 
that the Chilean people could win imperialism, like in Cuba. 
However, like Cuba, Chile needed the help of other peoples (UN 
COMUNICATO…, 1973). Moreover, the newspaper published a 
prophetical Guevara’s text where he warned that when a progres-
sive government is established through democratic elections, the 
armed forces are unlikely to let it carry out substantial social refor-
ms (CHE…, 1973). The reference Lotta continua wanted to make 
to Chile is all too clear. Guevara probably wrote with the example 
of Guatemala and Arbenz in mind, since he was shocked by it at 
the time (ANDERSON, 1997). In the aftermath of the coup, even 
owning Cuban magazines could be dangerous (HUTTER, 1973). 
According to the Paolo Hutter, an activist who had been detained 
in Chile after the coup, copies of the Granma were given to detai-
nees as toilet paper (I GIORNI…, 1973).
6 Cuba and the sossi case
As we have seen, Lotta continua reported that Cuba was a 
possible destination for many Chilean political exiles. However, 
in May 1974 a possibility arose that Cuba could be a destination 
for certain Italian leftist convicts. In this case the influence of Che 
Guevara and of the Cuban Revolution on the Italian Left intersects 
with the topic of the Italian lotta armata or lottarmatismo (“armed 
struggle”). In the specific Italian meaning, the term “lotta armata” 
is not generic, but indicates a wide series of leftist armed groups 
which were active in Italy in the 1970s (GALLI, 2007; TANTURLI, 
2018; BINI, 2017; FERRIGNO, 2008; LICCIARDI, 2014; MORONI et 
al., 2009; NACCARATO, 2015; STECCANELLA, 2013; DONATO, 
2014; LUCARELLI, 2010; TABACCO, 2010; SOMMIER, 2009; NERI 
SERNERI, 2012; BOCCA, 1985; BALDONI; PROVVISIONATO, 
2009; FARÉ; SPIRITO, 1979). Their influence on Italian history 
was such that the 1970s are still remembered in Italy as the “anni 
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di piombo” or “lead years”. The term comes from the German 
film director Margarethe von Trotta’s 1981 film Die bleierne Zeit 
(BARRA; VENTURA, 2018; LAZAR; MATARD-BONUCCI, 2010; 
MONTANELLI; CERVI, 1991; RUGGIERO, 2006). Che Guevara was 
one of their inspirers, though there is no space here to trace in 
detail his influence on them. Regarding the concrete case repor-
ted by Lotta continua, Cuba was seen as a possible exile destina-
tion also for certain Italian leftist convicts, namely the members 
of the Genoa “October 22 Group” (MARIO…, 1974) – see Serafino 
Ospedaletto (2016) and Piano (2008). 
The story, however, is more complicated. On April 18, 1974 
he Red Brigades (Brigate rosse, BR) – which would become the 
most professional and feared armed leftist group in Italy – had 
kidnapped the judge Mario Sossi, who had a reputation for being 
a hard-handed, right-wing judge (RUGGIERO, 2007). Incidentally, 
Lotta continua will later note that Renato Curcio, one of the BR 
leaders, had studied Guevara during his politically active university 
years (ARRESTATO…, 1974). In exchange for Sossi’s release, the 
BR requested the liberation of the imprisoned October 22 Group. 
The Group should have been handed over to the Cuban embassy in 
the Vatican. The newspaper quoted the BR communiqué, reques-
ting that “the eight comrades of the October 22 find asylum in the 
Cuban embassy of the Vatican City State [emphasis in the original] 
So that their safety could be guaranteed” (LE BRIGATE…, 1974, p. 
01). Really LC – which criticised the Red Brigades – noted on May 7 
that the BR’s “proposal” of asylum to Cuba was “very unlikely” (SI 
SCATENA…, 1974, p. 01). 
The Sossi case presented a situation which involved the Cuban 
government and put them in an extremely uncomfortable position. 
The October 22 members were considered terrorists by the Italian 
state. Therefore, as Lotta continua explained, the Italian govern-
ment had no intention to grant them passports, so that they could 
not leave the country. The October 22 members did not need a 
passport to reach the Vatican, where the principle of extra-terri-
toriality would not have allowed the Italian state to arrest them. 
However, the Cuban government had refused to give them visas. 
Probably, the BR hoped to use the Vatican card to bypass Cuban 
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refusal, at least temporarily. Moreover, once in the Cuban embas-
sy, the October 22 members would have been under the protection 
of diplomatic extra-territoriality within the Vatican. That means 
that the pope could not have handed them over to the Italian state 
without Cuban consent, even if he wanted to. A popular jury agreed 
to free the convicts, but their decision was contested by the gene-
ral prosecutor Coco. On its May 24 issue Lotta continua lamented 
allegations that Fidel Castro in person had spoken against granting 
asylum to the October 22 militants (SOSSI-CONTINUA…, 1974). 
However, the newspaper was printed before knowing that Sossi 
had already been liberated in Milan the previous day, May 23. In the 
Sossi case, the BR opted for a symbolic abduction and decided not 
to kill the hostage, even though their requests had not been satis-
fied. Their behaviour was different with the 1978 Moro kidnapping 
(MONETTA, 2009; BIANCONI, 2008; MASTROGREGORI, 2012). 
7  Towards a new view
Interestingly, in February 1974 Lotta continua dedicated an arti-
cle to Brezhnev’s visit to Cuba. This visit was an occasion for the 
newspaper to elaborate a few reflections on Soviet-Cuban rela-
tions. According to Lotta continua, ties between Cuba and the USSR 
were growing stronger and more structured, since economic colla-
boration was no more limited to Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar. 
Lotta continua argued that, on the one hand, the Soviet agree-
ment to buy Cuban sugar had saved the island from US economic 
blockade. On the other, it “forced the first socialist country of the 
continent” to stay with the “traditional and paralysing monocul-
ture of the colonial era” (IL VIAGGIO…, 1974, p. 03). Regarding 
latest developments, why did Brezhnev visit Cuba? Most likely, 
Brezhnev had gone to Cuba to try to moderate Castro, rather than 
to agree on new strategic lines. However, Lotta continua thought 
that Cuban-Soviet relations were likely to grow in importance after 
the Chilean coup. The coup could convince the Soviet Union that 
peaceful coexistence was not feasible, and that is why the USSR 
had to align itself more closely with Cuba. 
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Interestingly, the newspaper thought that Cuba was “caught 
between two fires”: US imperialism and Soviet economic aid. In 
fact, Cuba owed to the USSR essential material – including mili-
tary – supplies. However, Cuba’s “bargaining power” had increa-
sed. Couldn’t it be that the USSR now needed Cuba no less than 
Cuba needed the USSR? In a situation of increasing danger, when 
peaceful coexistence was becoming more and more difficult, the 
Cuban stronghold might have been useful.  
In March 1974, Lotta continua reported the birth of the 
Revolutionary Coordination Council of Latin America, an orga-
nisation uniting several South American revolutionary groups. 
Unsurprisingly, the Council was based on Che Guevara’s advice as 
expressed in his famous message to the Tricontinental. In that text, 
Guevara envisioned the possibility of “Coordination Councils” to 
better counter US imperialism. That is precisely what Uruguayan 
Tupamaros, the Chilean MIR, the Bolivian ELN and the Argentinian 
ERP did. The Council underlined that it had given life to “one of 
the main strategic ideas of the Comandante Che Guevara, hero, 
symbol and pioneer of continental [South American] socialist 
revolution” (LE DICHIARAZIONI…, 1974, p. 03).      
Apart from the already mentioned Chilean case, Lotta continua 
also underlined the importance of Guevara’s figure in third coun-
tries. For example, it reported that on October 8, 1974 Portuguese 
factories observed one minute of silence as a homage to Che 
Guevara, accepting a proposal of the Cuba-Portugal friendship 
association. Guevara was also present in Portuguese workers’ 
discussions. The newspaper underlined that this was all the more 
important since Portugal had just recently gone out of 50 years of 
Fascism (PORTOGALLO…, 1974) – see Green (1976), Mailer (2012) 
and Maxwell (2009). Lotta continua assured that Che Guevara’s 
portrait was on the desk of Serras Lopes, one the leaders of the MFA 
(Movimento das Forças Armadas) responsible for the Carnation 
Revolution (LA LOTTA…, 1974).
On October 8, 1974 Lotta continua commemorated the seventh 
anniversary of Guevara’s death publishing a few of his writings 
and critically reviewing his ideas and legacy in the light of subse-
quent events. In fact, according to the newspaper, Guevara’s death 
The cuban revoluTion, che and lotta continua
Tensões Mundiais, ForTaleza, v. 16, n. 31 P. 219-245, 2020   |  237
seemingly signed the end of “an entire chapter of revolutionary 
struggle in Latin America”. In reality, a “myth” had died, the myth 
of “an imminent revolutionary blaze which would rage all over the 
continent following the multiplication and the spread of guerril-
la movements”. Lotta continua was evidently criticising the foco 
theory, or foquismo. However, Guevara’s political and strategic 
contribution could not be reduced to that. Lotta continua admitted 
that “the path of the development of revolution in Latin American 
showed to be well longer, curvy and difficult” than that simplistic 
thesis would imply. Armed struggle could not be detached from 
the development of a mass movement. According to the newspa-
per, seven years after Guevara’s death it was possible to “get the 
less contingent and more profound sense of the deeds of the great 
[South] American revolutionary” (SETTE…, 1974, p. 03).
8 Conclusions: is che relevant in present-day Italy?
Finally, I would like to shortly assess whether Guevara’s legacy 
may be relevant in present-day Italy. The biographer Castañeda 
(1998) underlined that Guevara is a figure belonging to the past. 
One may agree insofar history never repeats itself, and Guevara 
lived in a world which was very different from the pre present-day 
one. However, I argue that there might still be something relevant 
about Che’s deeds and thought in present-day Italy. 
In his recent book on the Sino-Soviet competition for influen-
ce in the Third World, Jeremy Friedman (2015) argues that during 
the Cold War there were two basic models of revolution: the anti-
-capitalist and the anti-imperialist/anti-colonialist revolution. 
Inexplicably, he considers Guevara as a supporter of the first as 
opposed to the second. This reading of Guevara’s life and thought 
is extremely partial and does not see that what was remarkable 
about him was exactly the union of these two goals.
Today, Europe in general and Italy in particular is experiencing 
its darkest age since World War II. Italy is plighted by a level of 
racism comparable only to the 1930s - 1940s. What is worse is 
that this racism is under the guise of right-wing populism. Those 
who mostly loathe migrants in present-day in Italy are what Emilio 
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Quadrelli calls the “white underclass” (QUADRELLI, 2007, p. 15) 
that is the local as opposed to the foreign working class. This 
hatred comes from economic frustration and from the belief that 
migrants are a bunch of parasites – or that they came to steal the 
few jobs available. According to 2011 data, in Italy there are appro-
ximately 5.4 million migrants, of whom almost 350,000 are from 
South America (RINIOLO, 2012).
The problem is that migrants living in “democratic” Europe – 
this includes non-European citizens married with European citi-
zens – hardly enjoy any democracy. At most, what they have to 
face may be termed a master race democracy (LOSURDO, 2011). 
Specifically, in Italy they have no political rights, and apart from 
societal racism they have to face aberrant forms of state racism. 
To legally reside in Italy, migrants have to apply for a residence 
permit at the police, often going through a metal detector, where 
their fingerprints are taken. However, relevant laws give the police 
complete arbitrariness, which means that they can grant or deny 
a residence permit without any explanation. These human beings 
are criminalised for the sole fact of being foreigners, and Italian 
policemen’s ignorance and racist behaviour make only things 
worse (GABBAS, 2018). Apart from racism common to all, colour 
matters: South Americans of black or indio complexion fare worse 
than whites. Not to speak of detention centres for migrants, real 
prisons where a migrant can be held for indefinite time without 
trial for the sole fact of being without a valid residence permit 
(QUADRELLI, 2007; ROVELLI, 2006). Both Quadrelli (2007) and 
the Italian Jewish intellectual Moni Ovadia (ROVELLI, 2006, p. 281 
- 283) go as far as to say that these detention centres are veri-
table concentration camps. Finally, the European Union recently 
admitted that EU border guards have the right to shoot trespassing 
migrants (SI PUÒ…, 2020). 
Clearly, in present-day Europe migrants face a regime of 
violent state racism which is in many ways a continuation of colo-
nialism – while their countries have been robbed for centuries 
by European powers. Migrant communities in Italy are a sort of 
disenfranchised inner exploitation colony, needed to perform the 
most menial, underpaid and dangerous jobs which Italians simply 
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will not take. Moreover, this foreign proletariat is useful to divert 
the hatred of the Italian proletariat from the Italian bourgeoisie. 
It is here that Guevara’s deeds and thought could be extremely 
relevant. Certainly, it is very difficult to defend oneself without a 
proper ideological base. Guevara’s radical anticolonialism could 
be a political and moral example which could inspire migrants 
in general. However, studying Che’s legacy could be useful espe-
cially for South American migrants, for obvious language and 
cultural reasons. Emilio Quadrelli (2007) already showed that 
Latin American communities living in Italy can sometimes unite 
to defend themselves, for example freeing their “brothers” from 
detention centres. Guevara’s radical anticolonialism could be an 
ideological glue uniting these communities. Migrants living in Italy 
must face reality: they will be subject to ever growing levels of 
racism and violence. In this exceptional situation the organisation 
of self-defence is extremely relevant. 
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